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THE TAx TREATMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
UNDER 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2)
Treva Lowery Mclnnis
I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Horton v. Com-
missioner,1 which affirmed the Tax Court's holding, was the first federal circuit
opinion to interpret Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter the Code] § 104(a)(2) as
excluding punitive damages recovered for personal, physical injury from the tax-
payer's gross income. This decision conflicts with the decisions of five other cir-
cuits which have considered this issue.
This Comment will examine the tax treatment of punitive damages by looking
at the significant case law of the Sixth Circuit, as well as the decisions of the
other circuits and the Supreme Court. Also, this Comment will consider the
position taken on this issue by the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter the
Service].
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TAx TREATMENT
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A taxpayer's gross income includes "all income from whatever source
derived."2 All realized accessions to wealth are presumed to be taxable income,
unless the taxpayer can demonstrate that an acquisition is specifically exempted
from taxation.3 Therefore, it is clear that personal injury damage recovery is an
accession to wealth and will be included in gross income unless specifically
excluded under another section of the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 104 of the Code is the exclusionary provision for damage recoveries
for personal injuries. This section entitled, "Compensation for Injuries or
Sickness," excludes from gross income "any damages received ... on account of
personal injuries or sickness."4 The ambiguous language of the statute has facili-
tated much discussion. The courts do not agree whether punitive damages
should be included in gross income, and the Service has historically rendered
inconsistent rulings on the issue.
A. The Internal Revenue Service ' Rulings
on Punitive Damages
The Service has vacillated on the issue of whether punitive damages are or are
not included in the taxpayer's gross income. This vacillation has contributed to
the confusion surrounding the issue of taxation of punitive damages.
1. 33 E3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994), affg Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 101 (1993).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1994) states that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means
all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items." Section 61 then
lists items that are included in gross income. Id.
3. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,430 (1955).
4. 26 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
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The Service first issued Revenue Ruling 58-418' in which the taxpayer
received both compensatory and punitive damages in settlement of a libel suit.
The Service, relying on Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,8 held that the
punitive damages were not excludable from gross income.
The Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass addressed the taxation of punitive dam-
ages received as a result of fraud and antitrust actions The Court stated that it
was Congress' intent to "tax all gains except those specifically exempted" and
that punitive damages were "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."8 The Court in Glenshaw
Glass did not specifically address the taxation of punitive damages received as a
result of personal injury, but courts have relied on the language in Glenshaw
Glass to hold that punitive damages should be included in gross income.
However, § 104(a)(2) is evidence of Congress' intent to exclude any damages as
a result of personal injury.
Since the Court did not specifically address punitive damages received for per-
sonal injury, the Service must have relied on footnote eight in the Supreme
Court's opinion.9 This footnote stated that "[d]amages for personal injury are by
definition compensatory only. Punitive damages, on the other hand, cannot be
considered a restoration of capital for taxation purposes."10 The Court used this
footnote to illustrate the difference in "return of capital" and "accession to
wealth" and not to say that punitive damages should be included in gross
income.1 Punitive damages are considered an accession to wealth because they
are non-restorative in nature. However, this determination does not override the
plain language of § 104(a)(2) which does not limit the exemption to compensato-
ry damages.
Subsequently, the Service reversed its position in Revenue Ruling 75-45, hold-
ing that punitive damages in a wrongful death action were excluded from gross
income. 2 The Service stated in its ruling that "under section 104(a)(2) any dam-
ages, whether compensatory or punitive, received on account of personal injuries
or sickness are excludable from gross income."'3
The Service's current position is that § 104(a)(2) does not exclude punitive
damages. 14 The Service stated in Revenue Ruling 84-108 that "[a]n award of
punitive damages ... does not compensate a taxpayer for a loss but adds to the
taxpayer's wealth. Furthermore, punitive damages are awarded not 'on account
5. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18 (superseded by Rev. Rul. 85-2 C.B. 51).
6. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 430-31.
9. Brian R. Greenstein & Mark B. Persellin, Recent Developments Provide Support for Excluding Punitive
Damages from Income, 79 J. TAX'N 108, 109 (1993).
10. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955).
11. Greenstein & Persellin, supra note 9.
12. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
13. Id.
14. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. The Service revoked Revenue Ruling 75-45 after litigating a position
contrary to this Ruling in Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 E2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit, relying on
Revenue Ruling 75-45, held that punitive damages received by the plaintiff on account of his personal injury
were excludable under § 104(a)(2). 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983).
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of personal injury,' as required by § 104(a)(2), but are determined with reference
to the defendant's degree of fault.""5
B. Interpretations of Section 104(a) (2)
by the Circuit Courts
The following discussion illustrates the disparity of the circuit courts' opinions
concerning the taxation of punitive damages received as a result of personal
injury. The Ninth, Fourth, Federal, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, have, for various
reasons, held that punitive damages should be included in gross income. The
Sixth Circuit, however, affirmed the Tax Court's decision that punitive damages
should be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2).
1. The Ninth Circuit's Rulings
In Roemer v. Commissioner,1" the taxpayer, a successful insurance salesman,
alleged that a credit report prepared by Retail Credit Company was published
"'with the intent to damage his reputation, and to injure him in his business pro-
fession and occupation""' 7 The jury awarded $40,000 in compensatory damages
and $250,000 in punitive damages for his injuries resulting from Retail Credit's
libelous behavior. 8 The jury did not specify whether the award was for injury to
Roemer's personal reputation or his professional reputation, nor did the jury
specify whether the award was for his personal injury or his economic loss. 9
Roemer reported only $16,020 of the damages as income on his federal tax
return.20 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that all of the damages
awarded should be included in gross income.21 The Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner's decision, stating that the compensatory damages were not
exempt under § 104(a)(2) because Roemer had failed to show that these damages
were awarded as a result of an injury to his personal reputation.2 Also, the court
found that the punitive damages were included in gross income, since the com-
pensatory damages were awarded for damage to the taxpayer's professional repu-
tation.23
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision.24 The court recognized
that all accessions should be included in gross income under Internal Revenue
Code § 61(a) unless specifically excluded by another section of the Code. 2' The
court stated that Congress, since 1918, has intended that damages awarded for
personal injuries should be excluded from gross income per § 104(a)(2).26
15. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 34.
16. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
17. Id. at 694-95.





23. Id. at 695-96.
24. Id. at 700-01.
25. Id. at 696.
26. Id. (citing Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066).
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Therefore, the issue expressed by the court in Roemer was whether damages
received by Roemer in his defamation action were damages received "on account
of personal injury."27 The court stated that the Tax Court in its analysis "con-
fuse[d] a personal injury with its consequences and illogically distinguishe[d]
physical from nonphysical personal injuries."28 The court emphasized that the
issue was whether the injury was personal or nonpersonal, as that was the criteri-
on set out in § 104(a)(2).29 The court noted the fact that the Service had for a
long time viewed nonphysical injuries as personal.3
In determining whether defamation results in a personal injury, the court
looked to California law and found that defamation was an injury to the person."
The court stated that the "injury to the person should not be confused with the
derivative consequences of the defamatory attack, i.e., the loss of reputation in
the community and any resulting loss of income. '32 The court further stated that
regardless of whether the defamatory statements impair personal or professional
relationships, "all of the harm that is done flows from the same personal attack
on the defamed individual. 33
Upon determining that Roemer's injuries were personal, the court relied on the
Commissioner's interpretation of § 104(a)(2) that all damages received on
account of personal injury are excluded from gross income34 and held that the
compensatory as well as punitive damages awarded to Roemer should not have
been included in gross income. 5
After the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Roemer, the Service issued a new
ruling reversing its position on the taxation of punitive damages.3 In 1994, in
Hawkins v. United States,37 the Ninth Circuit changed its position on the exclud-
ability of punitive damages holding that punitive damages should not be exclud-
ed from gross income. 8 The court stated that because the 1975 Revenue Ruling
had been overruled by the 1984 Ruling, the Roemer decision should not be fol-
lowed. 9
In Hawkins, the taxpayers sued Allstate Insurance Company for breach of good
faith and fair dealing, recovering $15,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5
million in punitive damages.40 The taxpayers included the punitive damages
award on their 1988 federal income tax return and then filed an amended return
27. Id.
28. Id. at 697.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (superceded by Rev. Rul. 74-1 C.B. 33) (stating that damages
for alienation of affections, defamation of personal character, and surrender of child custody rights are damages
for invasion of personal rights and not income).
31. Id. at 697-99.
32. Id. at 699.
33. Id. at 700.
34. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47).
35. Id. at 700.
36. Rev. Rul. 84-108, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
37. 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994).
38. Id. at 1079.
39. Id. at 1081.
40. Id. at 1079.
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claiming that the punitive damages should have been excluded from gross
income and requested a refund.41 The district court found for the taxpayers on
cross-motions for summary judgment.42
The Ninth Circuit began its opinion by stating that any accession to wealth is
presumed to be taxable income under § 61 (a), and the taxpayer must prove that it
fits into an exception of the Code.43 The taxpayers contended that their punitive
damages award fit into § 104(a)(2) and that their award should be excluded
because the provision provided that "the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sum or as periodic payments)
on account of personal injuries or sickness."44 The taxpayers also pointed out
that the Service, in its regulations, defined "'damages' as amounts received
'through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-like
rights."'45 The taxpayers and the government agreed that the taxpayers' bad faith
lawsuit was a tort-type action and that the taxpayers had suffered personal
injuries.4 6 Therefore, the issue in this case was "whether § 104(a) excludes all
damages received in a tort-like lawsuit, or only those damages which have some
compensatory purpose.
47
The court began its analysis by looking at the plain meaning of the statute.4
The court determined that the phrase, "damages received on account of personal
injuries," might not mean all damages received in the personal injury lawsuit, but
rather only the damages that compensated the taxpayer for her personal injury. 9
The court reasoned that the punitive damages received by the taxpayers were not
"on account of" their personal injuries, because the amount of the damages did
not "bear [any] relation to the severity of [their] injuries, but rather was awarded
'on account of' the tortfeasor's egregious conduct."' The court held that the
punitive damages received by the taxpayers did not compensate them for their
injuries; therefore, the punitive damages award should not be excluded from
gross income. 1
Next, the court examined the taxpayers' contention that "'the inquiry under §
104(a)(2) is limited to an examination of the nature of the taxpayer's claim or




44. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988)).
45. Id. (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1993)).
46. Id.




51. Id. at 1083-84.
52. Id. at 1081 (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992)).
19971
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Supreme Court in United States v. Burke 3 "did examine the nature of the taxpay-
er's claim or injury to determine whether or not the damages ... were recovered
for personal injury," the Court in Burke "did not hold that whenever the underly-
ing claim [wa]s tort-like, all damages [were] excludable." 4 The court noted that
the Federal Circuit had recently, in Reese v. United States,"5 rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the taxpayer in Burke did not receive punitive damages and,
therefore, the Supreme Court did not address the excludability of punitive dam-
ages.56 The court stated that the Supreme Court mentioned punitive damages
only for illustrative purposes.5 7 The Court in Burke stated that the availability of
punitive damages indicates that the underlying claim is tort-like.5 8 The court
concluded that not only was the court to look at the nature of the claim but also
whether the damages were awarded on account of a personal injury.5 9 The court
reasoned that just because the Court in Burke did not include this additional
requirement does not mean that it was not an important factor in the equation.6"
The court stated that "[t]he Court's alleged failure to 'mention any additional
requirements for exclusion under § 104(a)(2)' means little, given that the Court
concluded that the taxpayers' underlying cause of action was not 'tort-like."'' 1
The court addressed the fact that Congress had amended § 104(a)(2) in 1989.2
The provision now states that the exclusion "shall not apply to any punitive dam-
ages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sick-
ness."63 This amendment did not apply to the taxpayers in this case because it
only applies to amounts received after July 10, 1989.4 Although the amendment
did not apply to the taxpayers, they wanted the court to read § 104(a) in light of
this amendment.65 The taxpayers contended that Congress would not have
amended the statute to omit punitive damages received for non-physical injuries
as excludable unless these damages were previously excludable under §
53. 504 U.S. 229 (1992). The Supreme Court in Burke expressly approved of the approach to section
104(a)(2) used by the Sixth Circuit in Burke v. United States, 929 E2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 504 U.S. 229 (1992). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit set forth the analysis as follows:
In sum, Threlkeld [v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aJd, 848 E2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)] and its
progeny require that for the purposes of § 104(a)(2), this court determine whether the injury is per-
sonal and the claim resulting in damages is tort-like in nature. If the answer is in the affirmative,
then that is "the beginning and [the] end of the inquiry." Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299. The damages
resulting from such a claim are fully excludable under § 104(a)(2). At no point do we inquire into
the nature of the damages involved. Rather the narrow scope of our gaze is properly limited to the
"origin and character of the claim, . . . and not to the consequences that result from the injury."
Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299.
Burke, 929 E2d 119, 1123, rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
54. Hawkins v. United States, 30 E3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 1994).
55. 24 E3d 228, 234 (Fed. Cir. 1994).





61. Id. (quoting Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229 (1992)).
62. Id. at 1082.
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104(a)(2). 6 The court rejected this argument, stating that "an amendment to a
statute does not necessarily indicate that the unamended statute meant the oppo-
site." 7 The court reasoned that the probable purpose of the amendment was to
clarify the law or to overrule recent cases which had held that punitive damages
were excluded and that damages recovered for employment discrimination were
excluded.'
Since the plain language of the statute, the interpretive case law, and the 1989
amendment did not answer the question of whether non-compensatory damages
should be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2), the court decided to
analyze the design of the statute as a whole. 9 The court began with § 104 enti-
tled - "Compensation for injuries or sickness" - and noted that the statute was
enacted to exclude damages that compensate the taxpayer for injuries.7" The
court then discussed the return of capital theory - that "'damages paid for per-
sonal injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer
whole from a previous loss of personal rights .. ,,"'71 The court concluded that
the punitive damages received by the taxpayers did not compensate them for
their injuries, but were awarded to the taxpayers in order to punish Allstate for its
wrongdoing.72 The court stated that ,the award of the punitive damages "ha[d]
nothing to do with restoration of lost capital."73 Therefore, the court held that the
taxpayers' pure accession to wealth should not be exempt from gross income.74
Judge Trott dissented from the decision of the majority in Hawkins.75 He
opined that the majority's restoration of capital theory could not be aligned with
the text of § 104(a)(2), its legislative history, or the case law.7" Judge Trott rea-
soned that the plain language of the statute - "the amount of any damages
received... on account of personal injuries or sickness" - does not allow a dis-
tinction between compensatory and punitive damages.77 His position is support-
ed by the Tax Court in Miller v. Commissioner78 and Horton v. Commissioner,9
which held that "any damages" implicates "all damages" and that the language
of the statute is unambiguous and does not permit a distinction between compen-
satory and punitive damages.
Judge Trott did not agree with the majority's view that the taxpayer must prove
that "(1) the damages were recovered in a tort-like suit and (2) the damages were




69. Id. at 1083.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962)).
72. Hawkins v. United States, 30 E3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1994).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1084.
75. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
79. 100 T.C. 93 (1993), affd, 33 E3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
80. Hawkins v. United States, 30 E3d 1077, 1085 (1994) (Trott, J., dissenting).
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was that because punitive damages were not awarded to the taxpayers to compen-
sate for their injury, but rather to punish the wrongdoer's conduct, and that
because the damages did not bear any relation to the injury, then the punitive
damages were not received on account of personal injury."e Judge Trott stated
that in most jurisdictions the plaintiff must show some amount of actual damage
before punitive damages are available.82 Therefore, he concluded "that punitive
damages are received on account of personal injury because punitive damages
are not available unless a personal injury has occurred."'83
Judge Trott stated that he would adopt the Tax Court's approach:
The beginning and end of the inquiry should be whether the damages were paid
on account of 'personal injuries.' This inquiry is answered by determining the
nature of the underlying claim. Once the nature of the underlying claim is
established as one for personal injury, any damages received on account of that
claim, including punitive damages, are excluded.84
This approach was used by the Sixth Circuit in Burke v. United States, and Judge
Trott believed that the Supreme Court, in reviewing the Sixth Circuit's opinion,
adopted this approach.8" He stated that if the Supreme Court intended for there
to be any additional requirements (the majority's second prong) for the exclusion,
the Court would have mentioned them.86
In considering the 1989 amendment, Judge Trott expressed that the taxpayers'
argument to the court was reasonable - that all punitive damages received
before the 1989 amendment were excluded from gross income.' He reasoned
that Congress was narrowing the statute by expressly excluding from the exemp-
tion of § 104(a)(2) punitive damages received in connection with a case not
involving physical injury or physical sickness; therefore, after the amendment,
only punitive damages received in personal injury cases involving physical injury
or sickness were excludable from gross income. 88 He expounded that "if
Congress wanted to clarify that all punitive damages were taxable, why did the
amendment create a distinction between physical and nonphysical injury
cases?"8 9
Judge Trott dispensed with the majority's return of capital theory by illustrating
that the damages the majority called compensatory are many times a windfall to
the taxpayer." He gave this example to illustrate his point:
Suppose [the taxpayers] are injured in an automobile accident and, as a result,




84. Id. (quoting Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 96 (1993), aff'd, 33 E3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1086.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1086-87.
90. Id. at 1087.
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weeks' lost earnings, the damages would clearly be excludable under § 104(a)(2).
But haven't they been made more than whole? After all, if they had worked dur-
ing those two weeks, they would have been required to pay taxes on their wages.
But because of the injury, they received more money than if they had worked.9
Judge Trott concluded his opinion by saying that Congress should straighten
out the confusion this statute has caused, but until they do, the courts should
apply the plain language of the statute.
2. The Fourth Circuit's Ruling
In Commissioner v. Miller,92 Bonnie A. Miller obtained net proceeds of
$525,000 in settlement of a defamation action and an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.93 She did not include any of the proceeds on her
federal income tax return.94 The Service determined that all of the proceeds were
taxable income.95
The Tax Court looked to the plain meaning of § 104(a)(2) and found that "any
damages" included compensatory as well as punitive. Also, the Tax Court held
that "on account of" indicates causation, and therefore, Miller was awarded the
damages because of a personal injury.97 Thus, the Tax Court held for Miller,
finding that none of the proceeds had to be included in gross income.98
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's holding.99
The court disagreed with the Tax Court's plain meaning approach in interpreting
§ 104(a)(2).' Instead the court stated that "to determine whether Miller's settle-
ment award may be excluded pursuant to § 104(a)(2), 'the nature of the cause of
action and the injury to be remedied must be identified."" 1  To make the deter-
mination, the court looked to Maryland law.1"2 The court found that under
Maryland law, a defamation action was considered an action for personal
injury."' However, in Maryland, punitive damages were considered a windfall
because they were not awarded to compensate the plaintiff for her injury, but
were "exemplary in nature" and were used to punish the wrongdoer." 4
The court agreed that "on account of" connoted causation, but rejected the Tax
Court's finding that "on account of" suggested but-for causation.' The court
91. Id.
92. 914 E2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
93. Id. at 587.
94. Id. at 587.
95. Id.
96. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 334-37 (1989).
97. Id. at 339.
98. Id.
99. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 E2d 586, 592 (4th Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 589.




105. Id. at 589-90.
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noted that the phrase just as easily could suggest sufficient causation." 6 The
court stated that:
[U]nder a sufficient causation approach, the fact that personal injury is a prereq-
uisite to punitive damages does not lead to the conclusion that the punitive dam-
ages were "on account of" the plaintiff's injuries because, even if the other ele-
ments of the tort are present, personal injury alone does not sustain a punitive
damage award.
The court emphasized that the plaintiff must also prove egregious conduct on the
part of the defendant in order to be awarded punitive damages.10 8 The court
determined that the plaintiff's injury alone was insufficient cause for the award
of punitive damages. 0 9 Therefore, the court concluded that § 104(a)(2) was not
clear on the type of causation intended by the "on account of" language.
The court decided that it must resort to two extrinsic aids to interpret §
104(a)(2). 1 1' First, the court noted the "well-recognized, even venerable, princi-
ple that exclusions to income are to be construed narrowly."'112 Since the statute's
language was ambiguous, the court adopted a more restrictive view of the types
of damages that could be excluded.'13
Second, the court addressed the underlying purpose of the statute.114 Adopting
the Ninth Circuit's rationale, the court stated that "'damages for personal injuries
are excluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer whole from a
previous loss of personal rights - because, in effect, they restore a loss to capi-
tal."'115 The court continued to say that "'[p]unitive damages, on the other hand,
cannot be considered a restoration of capital for taxation purposes."' 1 6 The
court concluded that punitive damages were a windfall and, thus, did not fall
within the ambit of § 104(a)(2) because they were not compensatory in nature. 17
3. Federal Circuit's Ruling
The Federal Circuit affirmed the United States Court of Federal Claims deci-
sion that punitive damages should not be excluded from gross income. In Reese
v. United States, 1 8 Elizabeth Reese won a jury verdict awarding her $150,000 in
compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages against her former
employers for unlawful termination. 9 The parties entered into a settlement
106. Id.
107. Id.




112. Id. (citing Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962)).
116. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955)).
117. Id. at 591.
118. 24 E3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 229.
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agreement after the jury verdict. 2° The defendant agreed to pay Reese $250,000
for her withdrawal of claims against certain defendants.121
Reese included the $100,000 in punitive damages on her 1987 federal income
tax return, but then in 1989 filed an amended return for a refund, claiming the
$100,000 should have been excluded for federal income tax purposes.'22 The
United States Court of Federal Claims granted the United States's motion for
summary judgment.'23 The Claims Court stated that the exemptions to gross
income should be construed narrowly, and thus, the exemption of § 104(a)(2) is
"limited to payments received as 'compensation."" 24 The court held that an
award of punitive damages was not compensation. 
12 5
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit framed the issue as "whether
punitive damages are received 'on account of personal injuries' and therefore
excludable from gross income."' 26 The court noted that the phrase "on account
of" was susceptible to two different interpretations.'27 The first, advocated by
Reese, was that "on account of" connotes a causal relationship between the
injury and the damages. 28 Therefore, "any damages ultimately received in a
case involving personal injury are damages received 'on account of' that person-
al injury."'29 The other interpretation, and the one advocated by the Government,
was that punitive damages are not received "on account of" personal injury, but
rather to punish the defendant's egregious conduct. 30 The court determined that
these two conflicting interpretations did not answer the question at issue; hence,
the court had to consider the language of § 104 as a whole.'
The court began by looking at the title of § 104 which is entitled
"Compensation for Injuries or Sickness."'3 2 The court stated that compensatory
damages, as defined by Black's Law Dictionary, "means damages 'such as will
compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as
will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury."
133
Thus, the court concluded that § 104 only encompassed payments that "make
good or replace the loss caused" by the personal injury.3 4 The court reiterated
the Claims Court finding that exemptions to federal income tax are to be con-
strued narrowly.3 5 Also, the court examined the jury instructions which explicit-











130. Id. at 231.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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damages were to be awarded to deter the wrongdoing of the defendant.13 Upon
this examination of the instructions, the court declared that the punitive damages
were a "pure accession to wealth" and, therefore, could not be excluded for
income tax purposes because the damages did not fall within § 104(a)(2).'
3 7
Relying on United States v. Burke, 3' Reese argued to the court that when inter-
preting the phrase - "any damages received. . . on account of personal injuries"
- one must look to the nature of the underlying claim rather than the nature of
the specific damages at issue. 39 In Burke, the Supreme Court held that the dam-
ages received must redress a tort-like personal injury in order for the damages to
qualify under § 104(a)(2). 4 ' Thus, the issue presented in Burke was simply
whether damages were awarded for tort-like claims.14' In defining a tort-like
claim, the Court in Burke stated that the "'hallmark[] of traditional tort liability
is the availability of a broad range of damages[,]' including 'punitive or exem-
plary damages."" 42 The court in Reese used the same rationale as the court in
Hawkins, and found that Burke was not saying that if the claim was tort-like,
then all damages awarded were within the § 104 exemption.'43
Reese also asserted that the Treasury regulations supported the view that all
damages received for a tort or tort-like claim were excluded under § 104(a)(2).'44
Treasury Regulation § 1.104-1(c) states that "'[t]he term 'damages received
(whether by suit or agreement)' means an amount received ... through prosecu-
tion of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a set-
tlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution."'1 45 The court dis-
pensed with this argument by stating that the regulation does not say that all
damages received in a tort or tort type action are necessarily received "on
account of personal injuries" within the meaning of § 104(a)(2). 46 Thus, the
Court of Appeals held that the punitive damages awarded to Reese were consid-
ered gross income and not excluded under § 104(a)(2) because the damages were
not paid "on account of personal injury."
147
4. Fifth Circuit's Ruling
The taxpayers in Wesson v. United States1" recovered punitive damages in an
insurance bad-faith action. 49 The taxpayers included this recovery as income on
their federal income tax return and were later refused a refund of this amount.5
136. Id. at 232.
137. Id. at 233.
138. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
139. Reese v. United States, 24 E3d 228, 234 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
140. Id. at 234 (citing Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229 (1992)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 234 (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. 229).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 234-35 (quoting 26 CER. § 1.104-1(c) (1987)).
146. Id. at 235.
147. Id.
148. 48 E3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995).
149. Id. at 895.
150. Id. at 896.
[VOL. 17:339
THE TAX TREATMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially addressed the issue of whether
these punitive damages should be excluded from taxable gross income by look-
ing at the language of the statute.15 The court found two ambiguities in the lan-
guage of § 104(a)(2) - the phrase "on the account of" and also what "personal
injury" means."'
The court began by revisiting the Supreme Court opinion in Burke v. United
States"3 which connected the identification of a personal injury to traditional tort
principles." 4 The Court in Burke also examined the remedies available to a
plaintiff under tort law, which included punitive damages.155 The Fifth Circuit
stated that the threshold question, according to Burke, was to determine whether
the cause of action redressed a personal injury.15 6 Upon review of Mississippi
law, the court found "that a bad faith cause of action [wa]s one sounding in tort,
and accordingly, one redressing a personal injury."15 7
The court next addressed the ambiguity of the phrase "on account of," stating
that one must "'look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the
design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy."" 58 The court found
that the statute, as a whole, was designed to compensate a person for some
loss."5 9 The court then addressed whether this taxpayer had been awarded dam-
ages to compensate for a tort-like injury.' Looking to Mississippi law, the court
stated that "punitive damages are not awarded to compensate a plaintiff for an
injury [but rather], 'to punish [the] tortfeasor."""' The Court distinguished the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Horton, stating that punitive damages in Kentucky
serve a compensatory function.'62 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit had to decide
whether damages that served as both a deterrent and compensation should be
excluded from gross income. 163 Whereas the Fifth Circuit's determination, based
on Mississippi law, was whether a damage award that served only as a deterrent
should be excluded. 64 The court concluded by stating that two requirements
must be met in order to exclude damages under § 104(a)(2): "first, that the
underlying cause of action [must be] tort-like under Burke; and second, that the
damages [are] received on account of the personal injury, that is, to
compensate.' 65
151. Id.
152. Id. at 897.
153. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
154. Wesson v. United States, 48 E3d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1995).
155. Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
156. Wesson, 48 F.3d at 897.
157. Id. at 898.
158. Id. (quoting Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 231 (Fed.Cir. 1994)).
159. Id. at 899.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daughdrill, 474 So. 2d 1048, 1052 (Miss. 1985) (respond-
ing to certified question by the Fifth Circuit concerning uninsured motorist act).
162. Id. at 901.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 901-02.
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5. Tenth Circuit's Ruling
In O'Gilvie v. United States,"' the jury awarded the taxpayers $10,000,000 in
punitive damages in a wrongful death suit.167 The taxpayers reported their share
of the punitive damages on their individual federal income tax return, and later
filed for a refund.168 The basis for filing a claim for a refund was that punitive
damages were excluded from gross income under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
169
The Internal Revenue Service took no action to refund the taxpayers' money;
consequently, the taxpayers filed suit against the United States for the refund.17
The district court held that the punitive damages were excludable from income
and that the taxpayers should have received their refund. 7' The Government
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.172
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did a survey of the decisions previ-
ously made by the Circuit Courts which had addressed this issue. 73 The court
agreed with the four Circuit Courts which had found the language ambiguous in
§ 104(a)(2) which says "the amount of any damages received.., on account of
personal injuries or sickness." '174
Because the court found the language in § 104(a)(2) ambiguous, it then sought
to ascertain Congress' intent when enacting the section? The court stated that
"[all] of the [other] subsections of § 104 address replacement [of income] for
losses resulting from injury or sickness and thus are compensatory in nature." 176
This led the court to the logical conclusion that § 104(a)(2) must be compensato-
ry in nature also. 177 The court noted that this conclusion was "bolstered by the
'default rule... that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed."'" 7"
Also, the court was troubled by the 1989 amendment to § 104(a)(2) which stat-
ed, "[p]aragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a
case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." '79 The court stated that
it was apparent to them "that when Congress was debating the amendment it
believed that § 104(a)(2) applied to punitive as well as compensatory dam-
ages."18 Notwithstanding Congress' belief, the court stated that the amendment
should not be used to interpret the intent of Congress in 1954 or 1918 because of
the lapse of time.
1 81
166. 66 E3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995).




171. Id. at 1553.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1555-60.
174. Id. at 1556 (citing Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. United States, 30
F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); Reese v. United States, 24 E3d 228 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990)).
175. Id. at 1558.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992)).
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded by stating that "it is not clear
whether Congress intended to exclude punitive damages from income under §
104(a)(2)."1 2 Neverthless, the court decided to rule with the majority and what
they called the "default rule" that exclusions from income should be narrowly
construed."'3
6. Sixth Circuit's Ruling
In 1994 in Horton, the Tax Court held that the Hortons had properly excluded
punitive damages from their gross income.184 This decision reaffirmed the Tax
Court's position on the excludability of punitive damages under § 104(a)(2). 85
The Tax Court had previously held in Miller that "'the plain meaning of the
broad statutory language simply does not permit a distinction between punitive
and compensatory damages.... Thus, we read 'any damages' to mean 'all' dam-
ages, including punitive damages. Further, 'punitive damages are received 'on
account of personal injury.'
1 86
In Horton, the Hortons' house had exploded as a result of the gas company's
failure to detect a leak in their house.187 The jury awarded Mr. Horton $62,265 in
compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages and awarded Mrs.
Horton $41,287 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages.188
The Hortons did not include the punitive damages as income on their 1985 feder-
al income tax return.189 The Tax Court held that the Hortons were correct not to
include the punitive damages.19 The Tax Court stated that "the beginning and
end of the inquiry should be whether the damages were paid on account of 'per-
sonal injuries. ' '191 The Tax Court explained that this determination was to be
made by looking at the nature of the underlying claim.192 In this case, the Tax
Court found that the nature of the Hortons' underlying claim was one for person-
al injury, and, therefore, the damages should be excluded under § 104(a)(2) from
gross income.'
93
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding. 94 The only issue that the
Sixth Circuit saw a need to address was whether the punitive damages received
by the Hortons were "damages received.., on account of personal injury."' 95
The court began its analysis by examining the Supreme Court's decision in
Burke.'98 The court acknowledged that the specific holding in Burke was not
182. Id. at 1560.
183. Id.
184. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 E3d 625, 626 (6th Cir. 1994).
185. Id. at 629.
186. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 338-40 (1989), rev d, 914 E2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).




191. Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 96 (1993), aftd, 33 E3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 E3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1994).
195. Id. at 626.
196. Id. at 629.
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applicable to the case at hand, but stated that the opinion would enable the court
to determine whether a claim was excludable under § 104(a)(2). 197 Although the
Supreme Court in Burke reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision on other grounds,
the Supreme Court expressly agreed with the analysis used by the Sixth Circuit
"insofar as it focused, for purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the nature of the claim
underlying [the taxpayers'] damages award."
' 198
Applying the analysis approved by the Supreme Court in Burke, the court in
Horton looked to the nature of the underlying claim brought by the Hortons 99
The court reasoned that if the Hortons suffered personal injury and the underly-
ing claim which resulted in damages was tort-like in nature, then all of the dam-
ages awarded to the Hortons were excluded from gross income under §
104(a)(2).2"' The court found that the Hortons' underlying claim "[wa]s one for a
personal, physical injury, therefore, the [Hortons] entire recovery [wa]s exclud-
able. 2 1 Further, the court stated that "[t]he Hortons' damages both - compen-
satory and punitive - were received 'on account of' their personal injuries from
the explosion."
202
Furthermore, the court declared that its holding was consistent with the 1989
amendment of § 104(a)(2) which stated that the exclusion would not apply "in
cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness. '2 ' The court, in
explaining its reasoning, stated in a footnote:
Since punitive damages in a case not involving physical injury or physical sick-
ness are singled out as being includable in gross income, the clear implication
of Congress' phraseology is that punitive damages in a case involving physical
injury or physical sickness are excludable, and were excludable even before the
amendment.2°4
The court stated that its holding was consistent with Treasury Regulation §
1.104-1 (c) which defines "damages" as "'an amount received... through prose-
cution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights." 2 5 The action
brought by the Hortons was a tort action.0
The court emphasized that under Kentucky law punitive damages serve a com-
pensatory purpose.0 7 The court quoted the Kentucky Supreme Court stating that
"[the] reason for paying punitive damages awarded to the injured party ... is
because 'the injury has been increased by the manner [in which] it was inflict-
ed. ' ' 2 8 The Sixth Circuit rejected the return of capital argument made by the
197. Id.
198. Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992). See also supra note 53 and accompanying text for the
analysis used in Burke v. United States.





204. Id. at631 n.12.
205. Id. at 631.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W2d 382, 390 (Ky. 1985)).
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Commissioner.0 9 The court explained that in many instances, money damages
could not make a plaintiff whole; therefore, the "make whole" theory is just a
legal fiction.210 If money cannot make a person "whole," then the money dam-
ages received are an accession to "wealth." '211 The court determined that "there
[wa]s no bright-line distinction ... between damages which make plaintiffs
whole and damages which are accessions to wealth." '212 Thus, the court conclud-
ed that the punitive damages received by the Hortons were excludable under §
104(a)(2).23
C. The 1989 Amendment of§ 104(a) (2)
The 1989 amendment was Congress' response to the confusion in the courts
over the proper application of § 104(a)(2). The amended § 104(a)(2) states
"Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case
not involving physical injury or physical sickness. '214 The use of the double neg-
ative has seemed only to confuse the judges that are trying to interpret the sec-
tion and then apply it in a case.
As is evident in the discussion above, the courts are still divided on the impli-
cations of the amendment on the tax treatment of punitive damages. Some
courts have taken the view that Congress was trying to narrow the application of
the statute, and, therefore, before the amendment, all punitive damages were
excludable, and now, after the amendment, punitive damages awarded in cases
involving personal physical injuries are excludable.215 Other courts, however,
interpret the amendment as only clarifying the existing law and, thus, hold that
punitive damages were not excluded before or after the amendment. Obviously,
the response by Congress did nothing to clarify the application of the exclusion
in § 104(a)(2). The application of the exclusion depends entirely upon the inter-
pretation of the individual court.
Ill. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
As seen in the above discussion, the federal courts are divided on the interpre-
tation and application of § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax
Court216 and the Sixth Circuit1 7 have held that punitive damages are excludable
from gross income, whereas the Ninth, Fourth, Federal, Fifth, and Tenth
Circuits2" have concluded that such damages are taxable. The various interpre-





214. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
215. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 E3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994); Hawkins v. United States, 30 E3d 1077 (9th Cir.
1994) (Trott, J., dissenting).
216. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Horton v.
Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93 (1993), affd, 33 E3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
217. Horton, 33 F.3d at 625.
218. Hawkins, 30 E3d at 1077; Commissioner v. Miller, 914 E2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Reese v. United States,
24 E3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Wesson v. United States, 48 E3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995); O'Gilvie v. United States, 66
E3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995).
1997]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
tations seem to hinge on the outcome of several considerations: (1) Whether the
Supreme Court in Burke endorsed the Threlkeld one-step test of simply deter-
mining the underlying nature of the claim? (2) What was Congress' intent when
it amended § 104(a)(2) in 1989? and (3) Does the return of capital theory
resolve the issue?
It is difficult to determine which court's interpretation of § 104(a)(2) is the cor-
rect one. However, the most logical seems to be the interpretation of the Sixth
Circuit in Horton. First, it is reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court in
Burke did not endorse the Threlkeld one-step test. The Court in Burke expressly
stated that it agreed with the Sixth Circuit's analysis: "insofar as it focused, for
purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the nature of the claim underlying [the taxpayer's]
damages award . , "" The Court did not explicitly or implicitly indicate that
the test of any other circuit court was more favorable. The Supreme Court con-
tinued to say that "[i]n order to come within the § 104(a)(2) income exclusion,
[the taxpayers] therefore must show that [their claim] . . . redresses a tort-like
personal injury. ... 220 The Supreme Court did not mention that a court had to
determine whether the resulting recovery was "on account of" that personal
injury, in addition to determining that the claim was tort-like. Therefore, it is
evident that the Supreme Court intended the courts to use the one-step analysis
set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Burke.
Second, the most plausible interpretation of Congress' intent in amending §
104(a)(2) is that of the Sixth Circuit in Horton. The court reasoned that since
Congress explicitly stated that damages recovered in cases not involving physical
injury or physical sickness are taxable, then the rational interpretation is that
damages for physical injury or sickness are excluded. Judge Trott's opinion in
Hawkins is also a very logical explanation of Congress' intent. He opined that
"if Congress wanted to clarify that all punitive damages were taxable, why did
the amendment create a distinction between physical and nonphysical injury
cases?"22' He believed that the reasonable interpretation of the amendment was
that Congress was narrowing the statute by omitting from the income exclusion
punitive damages received in cases resulting in nonphysical injury. He reasoned
that if punitive damages received in physical injury cases prior to 1989 had been
taxable and if Congress had intended to broaden the statute to include those dam-
ages, then the amendment could have simply been amended to read: "Punitive
damages in cases involving physical injury or sickness are excludable.
222
Finally, the Ninth, Fourth, and Federal Circuits have made the argument that §
104(a)(2) was enacted to exclude only damages which compensate a taxpayer for
injuries. These courts rest their argument on the fact that the statute is titled
"Compensation for Injuries or Sickness" and that punitive damages in most
states are awarded to punish the wrongdoer for his egregious conduct. Because
in some states, such as Kentucky, punitive damages serve a compensatory func-
219. Burke v. United States, 504 U.S 229, 237 (1992).
220. Id.
221. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084 (Trott, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
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tion, this analysis leads to inconsistent results depending upon the relevant state
law, thus undercutting the uniformity needed in the application of federal income
tax law. Also, the argument that § 104(a)(2) was intended only to exclude dam-
ages that restored lost capital to the plaintiff or made the plaintiff whole is not
sound because, as brought out by the court in Horton and by Judge Trott's dissent
in Hawkins, many times what is termed "compensatory damages" makes the
plaintiff more than whole. 23
Because § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code is still subject to interpreta-
tion of the individual courts, there is no definitive answer to whether punitive
damages are excluded from gross income. Therefore, we as taxpayers are still
faced with the dilemma of whether to include punitive damages on our federal
income tax return or whether to take the chance that the court in our jurisdiction
will interpret § 104(a)(2) consistently with the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit.
With the current confusion over the taxation of punitive damages awarded in per-
sonal injury cases, Congress desperately needs to take this opportunity to amend
and clarify this section of the Code.
223. See supra notes 91 and 180 and accompanying text.
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